Committee Scoring Rules: How to Choose a Good Committee?

Abstract

In the framework of multiwinner voting we are given a set of candidates, a set of voters with preferences over these candidates, and the size of the desired committee. The goal is to choose a committee that reflects the voters’ preferences as well as possible. Naturally, the exact meaning of the phrase “reflects the voters’ preferences” depends strongly on the context: If the candidates are participants of some competition, the voters are the judges, and the committee is to consist of the competition’s finalists, then we wish to select individually excellent candidates. If the candidates represent products that a company may offer and the voters are its potential customers, then we may prefer a committee of as diverse, yet satisfying, products as possible. Finally, if the candidates are politicians running for seats in a parliament, then we may most care about proportional representation of the voters. In this talk I will present the general framework of multiwinner voting and discuss the class of committee scoring rule, a very general class of rules applicable in multiple settings, including all the three mentioned above. I will discuss general properties of the class, its internal structure, axiomatic properties,and algorithmic issues pertaining to finding winning committees.

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About the lecturer

Piotr Faliszewski research focus is on the fields of computational social choice, preference aggregation, complexity of elections, and algorithms and complexity. He is particularly interested in ideas, concepts, and research spanning and linking all these areas. Also, he is interested in  structural complexity theory work and he pursue this direction of study.